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McALLISTER BROTHERS v. UNITED STATES
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 17 November1989
890F.2d582
The mere fact that the U. S. Coast Guard had considered improving the marking configuration of a reef, together with its
knowledge of prior vessel casualties on the reef, did not give rise to a duty to improve its then existing �arkers for the reef
•.

FACTS: The Barge McAllister #80 was being pushed by the
tug Majorie McAllister. The two vessels were lashed togther, in a
configuration forming an integrated tug and barge unit 445 feet
long. The mate on watch during the grounding was Anthony J.
McAllister, III, who had received his mates license in 1981 and
joined the tug as mate in July, 1982. Mr. McAllister had made
one prior trip, as a tug mate, up the Hudson to Albany.
The mate had relieved the watch at 1750 hours in the vicinity
of the Tappan Zee Bridge, and had available to him a seven inch
Decca radar and applicable charts of the Hudson River. The tug
and barge were proceeding at nine knots with an additional one
knot due to the flood current, making the true speed over ground
ten knots. The weather during the time of the grounding was clear
although the shadows were considerable along the river's edge.
The reef on which the barge grounded, Diamond Reef, lies in
the center of the river and is charted to be 100 yards wide with a
minimum depth of 5 feet inside the 18 foot curve. The chart 12347,
provides the above information and shows the reef area tinted in
blue. The chart also shows two channels, one on the east side of
the river and a wider one on the west.
The reef is marked by a single buoy to its south. The buoy is
attached to a concrete sinker with a chain. Its length permits the
buoy to withstand the pressures of the current, wind and winter
ice. The Coast Guard publication, Light List stated that the
Diamond Reef lighted buoy was replaced by an unlighted nun
buoy during winter months. The Diamond Reef buoy was also
painted to show that the preferred channel was to the west. The
lower court found that the buoy would move in a north south
direction for a few yards due to the current.
At the trial, experts showed that the preferred channel past
the reef was to the west. Also brought out at trial, was the cost of
installing a ice resistant warning which would have been $600,000.
The evidence showed that during the 13 years prior to 1983,
over 1.2 million vessels passed the reef area, which was then
marked by only the southerly buoy.
Prior to the accident the Coast Guard had considered improving
the marking of the reef, due to three specific vessel casualties
caused by passing the marker within 50 feet.
Mr. McAllister stated that on the date of the accident, he
observed the Diamond Reef buoy by radar at a distance of 1.5
miles. He stated that he attempted to pass the buoy to the west

by at least 140 feet. Mate McAllister found, after the grounding,
he was 150 feet from the buoy. At a Coast Guard hearing, Mr.
McAllister admitted culpability by saying he had let down his
fellow employees.
ISSUE: Whether the U.S. Government breached its duty to
mariners by allowing the buoy to be mispositioned or whether
there was a duty to use other means to adequately mark the reef?
ANALYSIS: The appellants McAllister Brothers Inc. <McAllister
Bros.) in this case were relying on the Eklof Marine Corp. v.
UnitedStates 762 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1985), decision which stated
that the Coast Guard was, "under a duty to place the buoy in
such a position that mariners who follow normal practice would
not be enticed to enter upon a danger that otherwise might have
been avoided." ld at 203.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in this case
however agreed with the trier of fact, that the buoy was not
mispositioned and that more buoys were not necessary to mark
the obstruction adequately. The Court acknowledged that the
buoy marking for Diamond Reef was subsequently changed, but
stated the Coast Guard has been granted broad discretion in the
marking of obstructions to navigation.
The Court was not persuaded by the McAllister Bros. argument
that the chain length attached to the buoy was excessive and the
actual position of the buoy was improper. McAllister Bros.
showed that the chain length was 135 feet while the water depth
was only 50 feet, and stated that the considerable length of chain
created a range of movement of 125.39 feet. The court was not
persuaded by this argument due to the testimony of a licensed
Hudson River pilot, Captain Sherwood Patrick, who stated that
the buoy would be either going upstream or downstream according
to the current. The pilot also stated that during the 150 trips he
made on the river, the buoy was only a few yards out of its
east-west placement.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's finding in
favor of the Government. The Court stated that the cause of the
grounding was attritutable solely to the inexperience of the pilot
and his undue concern about the shoreline of the Hudson River.
EdwardF. Kenny '90

STOCKSTILL v. PETTY RAY GEOPHYSICAL
United States Court of Appeals,Fifth Circuit, 29 November1989
838F.2 d149 3
Barge owner is liable to bareboat charterer for failing to comply with charter provision requiring it to name charterer as
additional insured under its P&I policy. Barge owner's failure to file a timely notice of appeal, precluded appelate review
of the dismissal of its third party action against the P&I insurer.
FACTS: Terry Wayne Stockstill (Stockstill) was injured while
unloading seismic equipment from a barge, the BB-300. He sued
his employer Petty Ray Geophysical, a division of Geosource,
Inc. ( GeosourceJ; the barge owner Thomas A. Blankenship d/b/a
B&B Operators <B&BJ; and various other defendants under the
Jones Act and general maritime law. Gedsource cross-claimed
against B&B, and B&B filed a third party claim against its P&I
insurer. Geosource and Stockstill settled prior to trial which left
only Geosource's cross-claims and B&B's third plarty claim to
be adjudicated.
Geosource operated the barge as bareboat or demise charterer.
B&B agreed to have its P&I insurance policy endorsed to name

insurer. B&B claims that its P&I insurance agent, Barly,
Martin and Fay of Louisiana, Inc. <BMFJ failed to endorse
B&B's P&I insurance to include Geosource as an additional
insured.
Before trial Geosource and B&B stipulated to the following
facts: (1) Stockstill was employed by Geosource as a Jones Act
seaman and he was a member of the crew of a fleet of vessels
including the barge BB-300; (2) Stockstill's injury aboard the
barge was caused solely by the negligence of a fellow employee,
Sandidge; (3) the barge was not unseaworthy; and (4) the
amount of money owed Geosource after it settled with Stockstill.
The District Court held that B&B was not liable to Geosource

Geosource as an additional insured. Since B&B failed to do so,
Geosource argues that B&B must stand in the shoes of the P&I

and that BMF, therefore was not liable to B&B. Geosource filed
(continues ...)
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a notice of appeal from the dismissal of its claim against B&B.
B&B did not file a notice of appeal from the dimissal of its claim
against BMF.
BMF contends that B&B may not appeal this determination
because it failed to file a notice of appeal and that Geosource has
no standing to appeal this dismissal because it never filed a claun
against BMF.
( 1J Is B&B liable to Geosource?
<2J May appellate jurisdiction be exercised over the
against BMF?

ISSUES:
clai lT:

ANALYSIS: The District Court relied upon Lanasse v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1971) in dismtssing Geosource's
claim against B&B. Geosource's claim was based upon the fact
that it would have been covered, had B&B ir.cluded Geosource
as an additional insured on B&B's P&I policy, as agreed. The
Lanasse case stated that a charterer could be covered by an
owner's P&I policy if (1) the accident was caused by a vessel or
its crew and (2) liability flowed from the insured's status as
vessel owner. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, found,
contrary to the district court, that Stockstill and Sandidge were
crew members of the BB-300. In fact, the parties stipulated that
Stockstill was a member of the crew of the 11eet of vessels which
included the barge. Geosource also passes the second requirment

because, as a demise or bareboat charterer, it may be considered
a vessel "owner" for the purposes of P&I coverage.
Since B&B breached its agreement to have its P&I insurance
endorsed to name Goesource as an additional insured it must
provide such coverage to Geosource.
The Court of Appeals rejected B&B's contention, relying on
Anthony v. Petroleum Helecoptors, Inc., 693 F.2d 495 (5th Cir.
1982) and Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337 \9th
Cir. 1981), that an initial notice of appeal under Fed. R. App. P.
\ 4)(a)( 1 J is mandatory and jurisdictional but a notice of protec
tive or cross-appeal under Rule \4HaH3J is permissive and
courts of appeal may retain all parties in order to do justice.
The Court stated that it is questionable whether Anthony or
Bryant remains good law in light of Torres v. Oakland Scavenger
Co., 487 U.S.
108 S.Ct. 2405, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 \ 1988J which
held that the requirments of Rules 3 and 4 are mandatory and
jurisdictional and that although the courts of appeal may liberally
construe those rules to determine whether they have been complied
with, the courts may not waive non-compliance.
The Court held, that even if Anthony or Bryant is good law,
the present case does not fall within the exception. The exception
is only available when the appealed decision could be read as not
being adverse to the party who failed to file timely notice of
appeal. B&B may not take advantage of this exception because
the dismissal of its claim was clearly adverse to it.
_,
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FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. LAKE SHORE INC.
United States Court of Appeals,Fourth Circuit, 20 September1989
886F.2 d 654
Where defendant does not have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to justify the exercise of personal.
jurisdiction, neither a general "stream of commerce" theory nor the unique nature of ocean-going vessels will support the
exercise of personal jurisditction.
FACTS: In April of 1985, General Electric Company <GEl
shipped a turbine accessory base aboard the M/V Paul Bunyon.
While the base was being loaded aboard the vessel a cargo winch
allegedly malfunctioned causing the base to fall and become
damaged. At the time of the accident the vessel was docked in
Charleston, South Carolina. Under its contract of insurance,
Federal Insurance Company <Federal) paid GE $322,543.46 fi>r
the damaged base. Plaintiff-appellant, Federal, a New Jersey
Corporation, thus became entitled to the subrogated claim of GE.
The M/V Paul Bunyon was designed and manufactured by
defendant-appellee Peterson Builders Inc. <Peterson), a
Wisconsin corporation with its principal place of business in
Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin, engaged in the design and manufacture
of ocean-going vessels. Defendant-appellee, Lake Shore Inc.
<Lake Shore), is a Michigan corporation engaged in the design,
manufacture, and sale of cargo winches, with its principal place
of business in Iron Mountain, Michigan.
The Lake Shore cargo winch installed on the M/V Paul Bunyon
was manufactured in Michigan and the vessel was designed and
manufactured in Wisconsin for American Heavy Lift Shipping
Company <AHL), a Delaware corporation. The contract of sale
between Peterson and AHL was executed in Wisconsin and
Pennsylvania. AHL accepted delivery of the vessel in
Wisconsin.
In March of 1988, Federal filed suit against Peterson, Lake
Shore and American Ship Management <American) in the United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina, involving
the court's admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. American is a
Delaware Corporation that hired the vessel's crew and handled
the vessel's insurance needs. Federal sought to recover the
$322,543.46 paid to GE plus interest and costs, for causes of action
including: negligence, strict liability, and breach of express and
implied warranties. Peterson and Lake Shore entered special
appearances and moved to dismiss for lack of in personam
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jurisdiction. American moved for summary judgment. The district
court held that it did not have personal jurisdiction over the
Defendants and granted Federal's and Lake Shore's motion to
dismiss and American's motion for summary judgment.
Federal appealed the district court's grant of Lake Shore's
and Peterson's motion to dismiss.
Lake Shore and Peterson do not maintain offices in South
Carolina and are not licensed to do business in that state.
Neither has agents, employees or subsidiaries in South Carolina
and neither maintains a bank account or owns real or personal
property in the state. Also, all of Lake Shore's products and
materials sold to South Carolina residents have been shipped
F.O.B. Michigan.
ISSUES: 1J Do defendants have sufficient "minimum con
tacts" with South Carolina such that the exercise of in personam
jurisdiction would not offend the "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice" embodied in the constitutional principles
of due process?
2) In the absence of such "minimum contacts" will a
general stream of commerce theory or the unique nature of ocean
going vessels support the exercise of personal jurisdiction?
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals, for the Fourth Circuit,
affirmed the district court's finding that defendants lacked suf
ficient "minimum contacts" with South Carolina to be amenable
to suit there. The court also held that without such contacts
neither the nature of ocean-going vessels nor a stream of com
merce theory supported the exercise of in personam jurisdiction
over defendants.
The court noted that Congress had not authorized nation
wide service of process in admiralty cases so that South
Carolina's long-arm statute (construed to extend jurisdiction "to
(continues...)

